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CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION:
JUST POLITICS OR FIDELITY TO THE PAST?
Russell Pannier†
A Community Built on Words: The Constitution in History and Politics. By
H. Jefferson Powell. University of Chicago Press, 2002. 251 pages.
$35.00.
H. Jefferson Powell’s book, A Community Built on Words: The
Constitution in History and Politics, can be read on at least two levels.
On the one hand, it can be read as an interesting and illuminating
account of a series of important constitutional issues and debates in
American legal history. In this regard, Powell takes up a substantial
number of issues, including Thomas Jefferson’s 1790 opinion
concerning the question whether the president or the Senate has
the power to choose the grade of diplomatic representation the
United States will use in any particular foreign nation, the dispute
between Jefferson and Hamilton over the constitutionality of the
national bank, the conflict between the Federalists and the
Jeffersonian Republicans over the constitutionality of the Alien and
Sedition Act, and many others. On the other hand, the book can
also be read as an argument for a certain method of constitutional
interpretation. I shall focus primarily upon this latter dimension of
the book.
Powell begins with a characterization of an account of
constitutional interpretation he deems popular but mistaken. He
does not give it a specific name, but for convenience I shall refer to
it as the “ideological” account. This is the view that “the justices of
the Supreme Court regularly vote in accordance with their
preferences rather than on the basis of precedent or some other
1
supposedly apolitical metric for decision.” According to this theory
of constitutional interpretation, the fundamental explanation for
† Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law.
1. H. JEFFERSON POWELL, A COMMUNITY BUILT ON WORDS: THE CONSTITUTION
IN HISTORY AND POLITICS 3 (Univ. of Chicago Press 2002).
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any particular justice’s constitutional interpretations is her or his
political philosophy. It is true that members of the Court often
write opinions that explicitly invoke the constitutional text and the
alleged historical intentions that support and explain that text, but
such conventional appeals are nothing but superficial masks for
underlying ideological agendas. One way of characterizing this
account of constitutional interpretation is to say that the
Constitution is not so much a text, or even a set of principles
embodied in a text, as it is a set of nine unelected and life-tenured
persons who have been handed the legal power to impose their
own political ideologies upon the rest of us. Alternatively, if one
prefers to talk in terms of “principles” rather than “persons,” one
might say that the Constitution is simply whatever set of principles
of political morality a majority of the Supreme Court happens to
currently accept.
Powell concedes the existence of evidence that appears to
support the “ideological” account. He acknowledges that “[m]uch
as many legal scholars dislike admitting it, the evening news is only
slightly oversimplifying when it talks in terms of liberal and
2
conservative wings on the Court.” He also agrees that there is a
sense in which constitutional law is a “thoroughly historical
3
phenomenon.” As he puts it, “[t]he sort of issues taken seriously,
the range of views seriously in play on those issues, the relative
weights of legal argument and policy preferences in the decisions
of judges and other actors, the extent of consensus and, conversely,
serious discord on constitutional matters . . . these are all
4
demonstrably related to the era about which one is thinking.”
Powell observes that this fact that constitutional law appears to be
historically conditioned causes intellectual anxiety for many: “The
historicity of constitutional law suggests the possibility that at the
heart of the Republic, behind the trappings of representative
democracy and the rule of law, we in fact will find a judicial
5
oligarchy ruling great areas of our common life by fiat.”
Powell goes on to identify two major alternative responses to
the “ideological” account. The first he calls the “fall from virtue”
6
theory.
This is the view that, although contemporary
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 4.
Id.
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constitutional interpretation is historically conditioned, this need
not be, and was not always, the case. There was some particular
historical point (which point tends to vary with different
proponents of the view) at which the Court interpreted the
Constitution on the basis of its “true meaning,” without recourse to
7
“contestable political judgments.” What we must do is return to
those “days of virtue” and begin once again to interpret the
8
Powell’s
Constitution in accordance with its genuine intent.
objection to this theory is that there never were any such days of
virtue.
The second response to the “ideological” account is the
9
creation of a “sophisticated theory” about constitutional law. “At
various times, including today, constitutional law has gone astray to
a greater or lesser degree by neglecting its true theory, but that can
be solved if judges and others will simply heed its principles . . . as
10
interpreted by the theorist.” I am not certain what sorts of views
Powell has in mind here, but perhaps he is thinking of proposals to
interpret the Constitution in some uniform way by invoking one or
another all-inclusive theoretical principle or set of principles. For
example, someone might propose to interpret every provision of
the Constitution in a way that maximizes economic efficiency, or in
a way most consistent with the principles of John Rawls, or in a way
most consistent with the principles of Milton Friedman, or in a way
most consistent with the best version of social choice theory, and so
on.
Powell rejects this second response as well. “The problem with
this cure is not that it is intellectually bankrupt . . . some of the
theorists are extraordinarily gifted scholars . . . but that each
theorist prescribes a different nostrum, and the courts generally
11
pay little or no attention to any of them.” As with the “fall from
virtue” theory, this approach is an “evasion, not an explanation, of
constitutional law’s close connection with political and cultural
12
history.”
Neither response “provides a sure foundation for
thinking that there is anything to ‘constitutional’ law beyond the
historical contingencies of changing judiciaries and shifting

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Id. at 5.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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13

political climates.” Both are “evasions of the history-bound nature
14
of American constitutional law.”
At this point it is clear that Powell rejects the “ideological”
account and both of the responses to that account he distinguishes.
But what precisely is his own account of constitutional
15
interpretation? He calls it the “historicist” interpretation. The
basic claim of this interpretation seems to be that constitutional law
is an “historically extended tradition of argument, a means
(indeed, a central means) by which this political society has
16
debated an ever-shifting set of political issues.” On the one hand,
Powell asserts that this tradition of argument openly encourages
legal and political actors to invoke their own personal philosophies
and ideologies in interpreting the Constitution. However, on the
other hand, he claims that this tradition simultaneously imposes a
“constraint” upon such ideological actors and their ideological
17
interpretations.
The Constitution specifies a normative
“vocabulary” in whose terms American legal and political actors are
expected to debate ideological issues: “The formulation of issues,
the range of considerations that can be considered or at least
openly acknowledged, even one’s own thinking about which
political outcomes are best, are shaped by the constraint of fitting
them within whatever terms and concepts currently are counted as
18
constitutional . . . .” Powell denies that this constraint upon the
vocabulary or terms of constitutional debate remains constant over
time; it changes in unpredictable ways with the shifting ideological
moods of the Court and the nation. “Some issues that were
19
debatable at an earlier point cease to be arguable . . . .” Indeed,
even the very forms of acceptable constitutional argument
themselves can, and often do, change in accordance with changes
20
in ideological developments.
According to Powell, this “historicist” interpretation of
constitutional law, if generally accepted, would result in a “more
modest vision” of constitutional interpretation than do “more

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 6.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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21

theoretical” accounts.
The “historicist” account views
constitutional interpretation as a “servant” of American politics
22
rather than as its “master.” It rejects the kind of sharp distinction
between “law and politics” that many other theories of
23
It “accords more constitutional
constitutional law offer.
significance to the actions of elected officials and sees less that is
24
unique about judicial decisions.”
If judges were to accept the
“historicist” approach they would take a “more modest approach to
25
their role . . . .” On the other hand, if the rest of the nation were
to accept this approach, then “politicians and citizens alike” would
have to acknowledge their own “responsibilities in maintaining a
26
constitutional order that is open to and inclusive of all.”
Powell makes an unusual, but interesting, argument for his
formulation of the “historicist” account of constitutional law.
Instead of offering general or abstract arguments for his proposal
he turns to the examination of a series of constitutional issues and
debates in American legal and political history in the hope of
thereby persuading readers that his account of constitutional
interpretation is the correct account. In particular he hopes to
convince readers through historical expositions “that constitutional
law is thoroughly historical, dependent throughout on the
contingencies of time and political circumstance, and that it is a
27
coherent tradition of argument.” What should we make of all
this? I shall offer just a few brief comments.
It seems to me that his characterizations of what he calls the
28
“two main responses”
to the “ideological” account of
constitutional law are inadequate. I assume that by the “fall from
virtue” theories he intends to refer to what are usually described as
“originalist” theories of constitutional interpretation, that is,
theories which maintain that the only justifiable methods of
constitutional interpretation are those that seek to identify and
articulate the original intended meaning of the constitutional text.
What I find questionable in Powell’s too brief characterization of
originalism is his argument that it cannot be correct since there
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 6-7.
Id. at 7.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 4.
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never were any “days of virtue” in which judges, or anyone else for
that matter, resolved constitutional issues without making
29
“contestable political judgments.”
Why he thinks that
sophisticated originalists would be logically committed to the claim
that there ever was (or ever could be) a time in which anyone
pursued the project of identifying the intended meaning of the
constitutional text without making “contestable political
judgments” is something I fail to understand. It seems obvious that
any claim to have correctly ascertained the original intended
meaning of a constitutional provision is bound to be regarded by
those who disagree as a “contestable political judgment.” In short,
any assertion about constitutional interpretation is inevitably
“contestable.” Why would any sane originalist deny that? Perhaps
Powell has in mind some narrower understanding of the phrase
“contestable political judgment.” If so, it would be nice to have it.
Powell’s characterization of the second main response to the
“ideological” account (a “theoretical” account) is even less
adequate. He devotes just one brief paragraph to the topic,
without mentioning any names and without offering any details
about the nature of the accounts he is targeting. I assume that the
typical reader is baffled at this point, lacking even a preliminary
and sketchy understanding of the sorts of constitutional theories
Powell rejects and seeks to distinguish from his own.
This last observation suggests a more general one. Powell’s
book addresses an issue (legal interpretation) that has been
extensively and illuminatingly discussed by many important
jurisprudential writers. One immediately thinks of writers such as
H.L.A. Hart, Ronald Dworkin, Joseph Raz, and many others. So far
as I can see, except for one brief and obscure reference to
30
Dworkin, there is a total absence of any effort to join issue with
any of the leading contemporary proponents of theories of legal
interpretation. In my view this is a substantial deficiency of the
book. Presumably, informed readers would like to know precisely
how Powell distinguishes his account of legal interpretation from,
for example, the much discussed account offered by Ronald
Dworkin, at least for the reason that doing so would help to clarify
and illuminate Powell’s own theory. Perhaps Powell thinks that
theories of legal interpretation propounded by writers such as Hart

29.
30.

Id. at 5.
Id. at 50.
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and Dworkin are so clearly misguided that no commentary is
necessary. Perhaps he thinks that such alternative theories are
directed at issues and concerns totally distinct from those he is
pursuing. Undoubtedly there are other possible explanations for
his reticence. But that reticence, if that is what it is, seems
unjustifiable. Why should fair-minded readers not expect at the
very least some explanation of Powell’s decision to make no effort
to relate his theory of constitutional law to any of the prominent
contenders?
What should we make of Powell’s own account in its own right?
What exactly does it come to? I have just noted the difficulty of
answering that question with any high degree of confidence. But if
I had to offer a tentative interpretation I would describe his
account in two alternative ways. First, focusing upon constitutional
law understood as a communal practice, I would say that, for
Powell, it is a communal practice of debate and argument whose
vocabulary, concepts, issues, and admissible forms of argument are
shared by the participants in that practice. Alternatively, focusing
upon that part of the work product of this communal practice,
which at any given time is legally controlling, I would say that for
Powell the Constitution is a temporal entity whose content, at any
given historical point, is the set of principles of political morality
currently adopted by at least five members of the Supreme Court.
There is a sense in which this communal practice is tied to the past,
in particular, to the actual document of the Constitution. But the
practice has no particular organic temporal continuity, other than
the brute temporal continuity resulting from the contingent and
unpredictable historical replacement of one vocabulary and set of
concepts, issues, and forms of acceptable arguments by such
vocabulary and the latter, in turn, by another, and so on,
indefinitely.
Assuming that I am correct about the nature of his account,
what should be said? It seems to me that one of the first things to
say is that it is unclear whether there is any significant difference
between Powell’s own theory of constitutional law and the one he
says he is fundamentally opposing, namely, what I have called the
“ideological” account.
As we have seen, he criticizes the
“ideological” account for its failure to take history seriously and for
its failure to impose any kind of meaningful constraints upon the
terms and forms of constitutional debate. The terms and forms of
the debate are set by whatever ideological passions happen to be in
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legal and political conflict at any particular stage of American
history.
But so far as I can see, Powell’s account is susceptible to
precisely the same complaint. After all, how difficult can it be for
competent lawyers to familiarize themselves with the currently
fashionable constitutional “vocabulary” and the set of currently
“admissible” concepts, issues, and forms of arguments? And once
having familiarized themselves with this current coin of the
constitutional trade, how difficult can it be to exchange any set of
philosophical and ideological norms into that coin? If the
perceived necessity of so translating one’s own ideological premises
and conclusions into the terms of the current debate is what Powell
means by a significant “constraint” upon constitutional
interpretation then it seems to me that he is mistaken. In
particular, it seems that the participants in Powell’s communal
practice of argument and debate would be no more constrained
than would be the participants in the communal practice
contemplated by proponents of the “ideological” account. For he
explicitly says that “most contributors to constitutional discussion
plainly have found that the Constitution, as they understand it,
31
generally ordains what they think best and forbids what they fear.”
If that is true then it seems pretty clear that there is really no
genuinely effective constraint upon the process of constitutional
debate and resolution at all. Powell’s claim that “history” imposes a
meaningful constraint looks empty, a mere gesture in the direction
of American piety for the past for purposes of public consumption.
In this regard, Powell makes what seems to me a very selfrevealing argument in the course of discussing Justice William
32
Paterson’s reluctant conclusion in Calder v. Bull. Paterson
33
reasoned that the Ex Post Facto clauses are limited to criminal laws,
despite the fact that as a member of the Philadelphia Convention
he had argued vigorously but unsuccessfully that the Ex Post Facto
34
prohibition should include civil, as well as criminal, legislation.
Powell observes that Paterson’s interpretation of the clauses
“contradicted what he thought the Constitution should have

31. Id. at 6.
32. 3 U.S. 386, 395 (1798).
33. Id. at 397.
34. Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretative Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV.
519, 581-82 (2003).
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35

provided.” But then Powell goes on to try to show how by using
the very same constitutional vocabulary and acceptable forms of
argument Paterson could have instead reached the opposite
conclusion—the very conclusion Paterson preferred on ideological
grounds. Powell concludes that there was no good reason why
Paterson could not have justifiably concluded that “the
36
Constitution means what in his view it ought to mean . . . .” It
seems clear from the context that Powell regards Paterson’s
situation as generalizable to any context calling for constitutional
interpretation.
Thus, so far as I can see, Powell is committed to the universal
proposition that it is always possible for skillful legal rhetoricians to
manipulate whatever constitutional vocabulary and accepted forms
of argument happen to be presently in vogue to reach any
ideological conclusion they desire. According to this proposition,
participants in the ongoing constitutional debates are ever willing
to claim loyalty to historical factors that serve to constrain and limit
their conclusions, but such claims are really nothing more than a
facade designed to mislead the public and perhaps even their own
intellectual consciences. Of course, given the critical things he says
about the “ideological” account of constitutional law, Powell would
not be willing to assert anything even close to the proposition
expressed by the immediately preceding sentence, but it seems to
me that such an unwillingness would be unjustifiable even on his
own grounds. As has been often noted, the “ideological” account
of constitutional law has it that judges who purport to “interpret”
the constitutional text are really just “making it up as they go
37
along” on the basis of their own ideological convictions. It seems
to me that Powell’s “historicist” account entails the very same
conclusion, despite Powell’s apparent belief to the contrary.
I shall conclude with a few brief comments, without any
supporting arguments, about the project that I think an adequate
constitutional theory would undertake. I agree with one of Powell’s
basic intuitions, namely, the intuition that “ideological” accounts of
constitutional law are inadequate. Of course, there are a great

35. POWELL, supra note 1, at 46.
36. Id.
37. See, e.g., Edward J. Sullivan & Nicholas Cropp, Making It Up—“Original
Intent” and Federal Takings Jurisprudence, 35 URB. LAW. 203 (2003); see also Larry Cata
Baker, Retaining Judicial Authority: A Preliminary Inquiry on the Dominion of Judges, 12
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 117, 123 n.19 (2003).
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many lawyers, judges, and politicians who act and speak in the way
described (and prescribed) by the “ideological” account. In
addition, so far as I can see, the world of academic law is
overwhelmingly tilted in favor of “ideological” accounts. However,
I do not believe that all the participants in the ongoing process of
constitutional discussion and debate practice the ideological
approach. Thus, to the extent to which “ideological” accounts
maintain that all such participants adhere to the “ideological”
account, whether they consciously do so or not, I disagree.
Further, putting aside the empirical question about the percentage
of participants who practice the ideological method, I think it
important to keep in mind the normative question, “What ought to
be the approach to constitutional interpretation?”
I also think that proponents of “ideological” accounts are
typically caught in a type of pragmatic incoherence with respect to
the relations between the past, present, and future, an incoherence
which I think is worth exploring. On the one hand, it seems
customary for ideological proponents to insist upon the
desirability, and indeed the necessity, of liberating themselves from
the past. In particular, they tend to insist upon the desirability of
liberating themselves from past communal normative judgments,
including judgments linguistically expressed in the form of
38
constitutional provisions.
However, on the other hand, it also
seems obvious that, once allowed to embody their own present
ideological aims in a legally enforceable form (for example, in
Supreme Court opinions), such proponents are especially
concerned that future generations regard themselves as being
bound by their past, as that past is embodied in the present
normative judgments of the ideological proponents. Presumably
the thought is something like this: “I certainly do not regard myself
as being morally or legally bound by the past normative judgments
of my community and it’s completely morally and legally justifiable
that I do not. I (and like-minded others) need and deserve
complete liberation from our communal legal past. But at the
same time, I firmly believe that others who come after me are
morally and legally obligated to regard themselves as morally and
legally bound by my present normative judgments. For, my
judgments are the correct judgments.” An argument can be

38. However, I think the same attitude manifests itself even with respect to
past communal normative judgments as expressed in ordinary statutes.
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formulated demonstrating the pragmatic incoherence of this line
of reasoning.
Finally, I agree with another of Powell’s basic intuitions, the
thought that an adequate account of constitutional interpretation
should make room for two apparently conflicting themes—on the
one hand, the desirability of legal interpreters regarding
themselves as legally and morally bound by past communal
normative judgments and, on the other, the desirability of those
same interpreters acting as more than mere transcribers of past
collective normative judgments, but also as active agents exercising
their own normative intuitions and judgments. In short, the
challenge is that of formulating a coherent account of legal
interpretation that somehow synthesizes two apparently disparate
elements—an attitude of loyalty to the past on the one hand and a
willingness to presently exercise one’s normative creativity on the
other. For the reasons I have indicated, I do not think that Powell
has managed to successfully carry out this project, but I am
convinced that the project itself is important, although difficult.
Part of that difficulty lies in the natural temptation to jettison one
of these two dimensions in favor of the other. However, both
dimensions must be held together in order to render intelligible
the very concept of a rule of law. One reason I think a coherent
synthesis of these two dimensions is possible is the fact that certain
religious traditions have apparently succeeded in doing just that
with respect to their own theological and normative pasts. I suggest
that it may prove useful to examine such traditions for the purpose
of explicating and translating their conceptions of religiously
legitimate interpretation into the context of legal interpretation.
In my view, any such account of legal interpretation should
include discussions of at least the following questions. First, under
what circumstances, if any, should anyone ever regard oneself as
bound by the past normative judgments of oneself and one’s own
legal community? In other words, why think that one should ever
be loyal to the past at all, whether to one’s own normative past or to
one’s own legal community’s normative past? Second, if there are
such circumstances, how should one go about exercising that fidelity
to the past? That is, what precisely is it to exercise loyalty to past
normative judgments, whether those judgments were one’s own or
judgment by one’s legal community?
I suspect that any even minimally adequate answer to these
questions will necessarily involve an explication and clarification of
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the concept of a normative principle. In particular, I think that it will
necessarily involve a clarification of certain relationships: the
relationship between normative principles and particular historical
linguistic formulations of those principles, the relationship
between normative principles and the subjective states of mind of
those persons who accept those principles, and the relationship
between normative principles and their implications, as drawn out
and articulated by interpreters.
With respect to this last
relationship, it will be important to draw a systematic distinction
between drawing out the logical implications of a normative principle
on the one hand and replacing one normative principle with
another. The former activity seemingly can be done while being
faithful to the past, whereas the latter cannot.
I also suspect that no adequate explication of the concept of a
normative principle will be compatible with the traditional
empiricist posture of reductionism concerning propositions.
Conceiving of propositions as ontologically reducible to linguistic
entities, or even to linguistic entities plus individual mental states,
necessarily precludes any adequate understanding of how
normative propositions could have a content transcending any
particular mental act of formulation or interpretation. I believe
that it is this transcendence of any particular historical moment
that makes it possible for normative propositions to provide the
organic temporal unity necessary for any genuine rule of law.
My hope is that clarifying and resolving these (and certainly
other) issues would make it possible to understand a constitution as
a set of normative principles simultaneously possessing an historical
origin and a potentially infinite set of normative implications,
where such implications await being drawn out and clarified by
legal interpreters simultaneously exhibiting both their fidelity to
their communal normative past and to their present normative
philosophical intuitions.
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